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ABSTRACT
Internet censorship is enforced by numerous governments world-
wide, however, due to the lack of publicly available information,
as well as the inherent risks of performing active measurements, it
is often hard for the research community to investigate censorship
practices in the wild. Thus, the leak of 600GB worth of logs from
7 Blue Coat SG-9000 proxies, deployed in Syria to filter Internet
traffic at a country scale, represents a unique opportunity to provide
a detailed snapshot of a real-world censorship ecosystem.
This paper presents the methodology and the results of a measure-
ment analysis of the leaked Blue Coat logs, revealing a relatively
stealthy, yet quite targeted, censorship. We find that traffic is filtered
in several ways: using IP addresses and domain names to block
subnets or websites, and keywords or categories to target specific
content. We show that keyword-based censorship produces some
collateral damage as many requests are blocked even if they do not
relate to sensitive content. We also discover that Instant Messag-
ing is heavily censored, while filtering of social media is limited
to specific pages. Finally, we show that Syrian users try to evade
censorship by using web/socks proxies, Tor, VPNs, and BitTorrent.
To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first analytical
look into Internet filtering in Syria.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the relation between society and technology evolves, so does
censorship—the practice of suppressing ideas and information that
certain individuals, groups or government officials may find objec-
tionable, dangerous, or detrimental. Censors increasingly target
access to, and dissemination of, electronic information, for instance,
aiming to restrict freedom of speech, control knowledge available
to the masses, or enforce religious/ethical principles.
Even though the research community dedicated a lot of attention
to censorship and its circumvention, knowledge and understanding
of filtering technologies is inherently limited, as it is challenging and
risky to conduct measurements from countries operating censorship,
while logs pertaining to filtered traffic are obviously hard to come by.
Prior work has analyzed censorship practices in China [13, 14, 19,
28, 29], Iran [2, 4, 25], Pakistan [17], and a few Arab countries [9],
however, mostly based on probing, i.e., inferring what information
is being censored by generating requests and observing what content
is blocked. While providing valuable insights, these methods suffer
from two main limitations: (1) only a limited number of requests can
be observed, thus providing a skewed representation of the censor-
ship policies due to the inability to enumerate all censored keywords,
and (2) it is hard to assess the actual extent of the censorship, e.g.,
what kind/proportion of the overall traffic is being censored.
Roadmap. In this paper, we present a measurement analysis of
Internet filtering in Syria: we study a set of logs extracted from
7 Blue Coat SG-9000 proxies, which were deployed to monitor,
filter and block traffic of Syrian users. The logs (600GB worth of
data) were leaked by a “hacktivist” group, Telecomix, in October
2011, and relate to a period of 9 days between July and August
2011 [22]. By analyzing the logs, we provide a detailed snapshot of
how censorship was operated in Syria. As opposed to probing-based
methods, the analysis of actual logs allows us to extract information
about processed requests for both censored and allowed traffic and
provide a detailed snapshot of Syrian censorship practices.
Main Findings. Our measurement-based analysis uncovers several
interesting findings. First, we observe that a few different techniques
are employed by Syrian authorities: IP-based filtering to block
access to entire subnets (e.g., Israel), domain-based to block specific
websites, keyword-based to target specific kinds of traffic (e.g.,
filtering-evading technologies, such as socks proxies), and category-
based to target specific content and pages. As a side-effect of
keyword-based censorship, many requests are blocked even if they
do not relate to any sensitive content or anti-censorship technologies.
Such collateral damage affects Google toolbar’s queries as well as a
few ads delivery networks that are blocked as they generate requests
containing the word proxy.
Also, the logs highlight that Instant Messaging software (like
Skype) is heavily censored, while filtering of social media is limited
to specific pages. Actually, most social networks (e.g., Facebook
and Twitter) are not blocked, but only certain pages/groups are (e.g.,
the Syrian Revolution Facebook page). We find that proxies have
specialized roles and/or slightly different configurations, as some
of them tend to censor more traffic than others. For instance, one
particular proxy blocks Tor traffic for several days, while other
proxies do not. Finally, we show that Syrian Internet users not
only try to evade censorship and surveillance using well-known
web/socks proxies, Tor, and VPN software, but also use P2P file
sharing software (BitTorrent) to fetch censored content.
Our analysis shows that, compared to other countries (e.g., China
and Iran), censorship in Syria seems to be less pervasive, yet quite
targeted. Syrian censors particularly target Instant Messaging, in-
formation related to the political opposition (e.g., pages related to
the “Syrian Revolution”), and Israeli subnets. Arguably, less evident
censorship does not necessarily mean minor information control
or less ubiquitous surveillance. In fact, Syrian users seem to be
aware of this and do resort to censorship- and surveillance-evading
software, as we show later in the paper, which seems to confirm
reports about Syrian users enganging in self-censorship to avoid
being arrested [3, 5, 18].
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first
detailed snapshot of Internet filtering in Syria and the first set of
large-scale measurements of actual filtering proxies’ logs. We show
how censorship was operated via a statistical overview of censorship
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activities and an analysis of temporal patterns, proxy specializations,
and filtering of social network sites. Finally, we provide some details
on the usage of surveillance- and censorship-evading tools.
Remarks. Logs studied in this paper date back to July-August 2011,
thus, our work is not intended to provide insights to the current
situation in Syria as censorship might have evolved in the last two
years. According to Bloomberg [21], Syria has invested $500K in
surveillance equipment in late 2011, thus an even more powerful
filtering architecture might now be in place. Starting December
2012, Tor relays and bridges have reportedly been blocked [23].
Nonetheless, our analysis uncovers methods that might still be in
place, e.g., based on Deep Packet Inspection. Also, Blue Coat
proxies are reportedly still used in several countries [16].
Our work serves as a case study of censorship in practice: it
provides a first-of-its-kind, data-driven analysis of a real-world
censorship ecosystem, exposing its underlying techniques, as well
as its strengths and weaknesses, which we hope will facilitate the
design of censorship-evading tools.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section reviews related work. Then, Section 3 provides
some background information and introduces the datasets studied
throughout the paper. Section 4 presents a statistical overview of
Internet censorship in Syria based on the Blue Coat logs, while Sec-
tion 5 provides a thorough analysis to better understand censorship
practices. After focusing on social network sites in Section 6 and
anti-censorship technologies in Section 7, we discuss our findings
in Section 8. The paper concludes with Section 9.
2. RELATED WORK
Due to the limited availability of publicly available data, there is
little prior work analyzing logs from filtering devices. A fairly large
body of work, which we overview in this section, has focused on
understanding and characterizing censorship processes via probing.
By contrast, our work is really the first to analyze traffic observed by
actual filtering proxies and to provide a detailed measurement-based
snapshot of Syria’s censorship infrastructure.
Ayran et al. [4] present measurements from an Iranian ISP, analyz-
ing HTTP host-based blocking, keyword filtering, DNS hijacking,
and protocol-based throttling, and conclude that the censorship in-
frastructure heavily relies on centralized equipment. Winter and
Lindskog [28] conduct some measurements on traffic routed through
Tor bridges/relays to understand how China blocks Tor. Also, Dain-
otti et al. [8] analyze country-wide Internet outages, in Egypt and
Libya, using publicly available data such as BGP inter-domain rout-
ing control plane data.
Another line of work deals with fingerprinting and inferring cen-
sorship methods and equipments. Researchers from the Citizen
Lab [16] focus on censorship/surveillance performed using Blue
Coat devices and uncover 61 Blue Coat ProxySG devices and 316
Blue Coat PacketShaper appliances in 24 different countries. Dalek
et al. [9] use a confirmation methodology to identify URL filtering
using, e.g., McAfee SmartFilter and Netsweeper, and detect the use
of these technologies in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Yemen.
Nabi [17] uses a publicly available list of blocked websites in
Pakistan, checking their accessibility from multiple networks within
the country. Results indicate that censorship varies across websites:
some are blocked at the DNS level, while others at the HTTP level.
Furthermore, Verkamp and Gupta [25] detect censorship technolo-
gies in 11 countries, mostly using Planet Labs nodes, and discover
DNS-based and router-based filtering. Crandall et al. [7] propose
an architecture for maintaining a censorship “weather report” about
what keywords are filtered over time, while Leberknight et al. [15]
provide an overview of research on censorship resistant systems and
a taxonomy of anti-censorship technologies.
Also, Knockel et al. [14] obtain a built-in list of censored key-
words in China’s TOM-Skype and run experiments to understand
how filtering is operated, while King et al. [13] devise a system to
locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of Chinese
social media posts, before the Chinese government censors them.
Finally, Park and Crandall [19] present results from measure-
ments of the filtering of HTTP HTML responses in China, which is
based on string matching and TCP reset injection by backbone-level
routers. Xu et al. [29] explore the AS-level topology of China’s
network infrastructure, and probe the firewall to find the locations
of filtering devices, finding that even though most filtering occurs in
border ASes, choke points also exist in many provincial networks.
3. DATASETS DESCRIPTION
This section overviews the dataset studied in this paper, and
background information on the proxies used for censorship.
3.1 Data Sources
On October 4, 2011, a “hacktivist” group called Telecomix an-
nounced the release of log files extracted from 7 Syrian Blue Coat
SG-9000 proxies (aka ProxySG) [22]. The initial leak concerned
15 proxies but only data from 7 of them was publicly released. As
reported by the Wall Street Journal [24] and CBS news [27], Blue
Coat openly acknowledged that at least 13 of its proxies were used
in Syria, but denied it authorized their sale to the Syrian govern-
ment [6]. These devices have allegedly been used by the Syrian
Telecommunications Establishment (STE backbone) to filter and
monitor all connections at a country scale. The data is split by proxy
(SG-42, SG-43,. . ., SG-48) and covers two periods: (i) July 22, 23,
31, 2011 (only SG-42), and (ii) August 1–6, 2011 (all proxies). The
leaked log files are in csv format (comma separated-values) and
include 26 fields, such as date, time, filter action, host and URI
(more details are given in Section 3.3).
Given the nature of the dataset, one could question the authenticity
of the logs. However, Blue Coat confirmed the use of its devices in
Syria [24, 27] and a few findings emerging from the analysis of the
logs actually correspond to events and facts that were independently
reported before. Also, this leak is not the first censorship-related
project carried out by Telecomix. Thus, we are confident that the
datasets studied in this paper provide an accurate snapshot of Syrian
censorship activities in Summer 2011.
3.2 Blue Coat SG-9000 Proxies
The Blue Coat SG-9000 proxies perform filtering, monitoring,
and caching of Internet traffic, and are typically placed between
a monitored network and the Internet backbone. They can be set
as explicit or transparent proxies: the former setting requires the
configuration of the clients’ browsers, whereas transparent proxies
seamlessly intercept traffic (i.e., without clients noticing it), which
is the case in this dataset.
Monitoring and filtering of traffic is conducted at the application
level. Each user request is intercepted and classified as one of the
following three labels (as per the sc-filter-result field in the logs):
• OBSERVED – request is served to the client.
• PROXIED – request has been found in the cache and the
outcome depends on the cached value.
• DENIED – request is not served to the client because an
exception has been raised (might be redirected).
The classification reflects the action that the proxy needs to per-
form, rather than the outcome of a filtering process. OBSERVED
means that content needs to be fetched from the Origin Content
2
Dataset # Requests Period # Proxies
Full 751,295,830 July 22-23,31, 2011 7August 1-6, 2011
Sample (4%) 32,310,958 July 22-23, 2011 7August 1-6, 2011
User 6,374,333 July 22-23 2011 1
Denied 47,452,194 July 22-23,31, 2011 7August 1-6, 2011
Table 1: Datasets description.
Server (OCS), DENIED that there is no need to contact the OCS,
and PROXIED – that the outcome is in the proxy’s cache. According
to Blue Coat’s documentation [26], filtering is based on multiple cri-
teria: website categories, keywords, content type, browser type and
date/time of day. The proxies can also cache content, e.g., to save
bandwidth, in the “bandwidth gain profile” (see page 193 in [1]).
3.3 Datasets and Notation
Throughout the rest of this paper, our analysis will use the follow-
ing four datasets:
1. Full Logs (Dfull): The whole dataset (i.e., extracted from all
logs) is composed of 751,295,830 requests.
2. Sample Dataset (Dsample): Most of the results shown in
this paper rely on the full extraction of the relevant data
from Dfull , however, given the massive size of the log files
(∼600GB), we sometimes consider a random sample cover-
ing 4% of the entire dataset. This dataset (Dsample) is only
used to illustrate a few results, specifically, for a few summary
statistics. According to standard theory about confidence in-
tervals for proportions (see [12], Equation 1, Chapter 13.9.2),
for a sample size of n = 32M, the actual proportion in the full
data set lies in an interval of ±0.0001 around the proportion
p observed in the sample with 95% probability (α = 0.05).
3. User Dataset (Duser): Before the data release, Telecomix
suppressed user identifiers (IP addresses) by replacing them
with zeros. However, for a small fraction of the data (July
22-23), user identifiers were replaced with the hash of the IP
addresses, thus making user-based analysis possible.
4. Denied Dataset (Ddenied): This dataset contains all the re-
quests that resulted in exceptions (x-exception-id 6= ‘-’), and
hence are not served to the user.
In Table 1, we report, for each dataset, the number of requests in
it, corresponding dates, and number of proxies. Then, in Table 2,
we list a few fields from the logs that constitute the main focus
of our analysis. The s-ip field logs the IP address of the proxy
that processed each request, which is in the range 82.137.200.42
– 48. Throughout the paper we refer to the proxies as SG-42 to
SG-48, according to the suffix of their IP address. The sc-filter-
result field indicates whether the request has been served to the
client. In the rest of the paper, we consider as denied all requests
that have not been successfully served to the client by the proxy,
including requests generating network errors as well as requests
censored based on policy. To further classify a denied request, we
rely on the x-exception-id field: all denied requests which either raise
policy_denied or policy_redirect flags are considered as censored.
Finally, we observe some inconsistencies in the requests that have
a sc-filter-result value set to PROXIED with no exception. When
looking at requests similar to those that are PROXIED (e.g., other
requests from the same user accessing the same URL), some are
Field name Description
cs-host Hostname or IP address (e.g., facebook.com)
cs-uri-scheme Scheme used by the requested URL (mostly HTTP)
cs-uri-port Port of the requested URL
cs-uri-path Path of the requested URL (e.g., /home.php)
cs-uri-query Query of the requested URL(e.g., ?refid=7&ref=nf_fr&_rdr)
cs-uri-ext Extension of the requested URL (e.g., php, flv, gif, ...)
cs-user-agent User agent (from request header)
cs-categories Categories to which the requested URL has been clas-sified (see Section 4 for details)
c-ip Client’s IP address (removed or anonymized)
s-ip The IP address of the proxy that processed the client’srequest
sc-status Protocol status code from the proxy to the client (e.g.,‘200’ for OK)
sc-filter-result Content filtering result: DENIED, PROXIED, or
OBSERVED
x-exception-id Exception raised by the request (e.g., policy_denied,dns_error). Set to ‘-’ if no exception was raised.
Table 2: Description of a few relevant fields from the logs.
consistently denied, while others are sometimes or always allowed.
Since PROXIED requests only represent a small portion of the
analyzed traffic (< 0.5%), we treat them like the rest of the traffic
and classify them according to the x-exception-id. However, where
relevant, we refer to them explicitly to distinguish them from the
OBSERVED traffic.
In summary, throughout the rest of the paper, we use the following
request classification:
• Allowed (x-exception-id = ‘-’): a request that is allowed and
served to the client (no exception raised).
• Denied (x-exception-id 6= ‘-’): a request that is not served
to the client, either because of a network error or due to
censorship. Specifically:
– Censored (x-exception-id ∈ {policy_denied, pol-
icy_redirect}): a denied request that is censored based
on censorship policy.
– Error (x-exception-id 6∈ {‘-’, policy_denied, pol-
icy_redirect}): a denied request not served to the client
due to a network error.
• Proxied (sc-filter-result = PROXIED): a request that does not
need further processing, as the response is in the cache (i.e.,
the result depends on a prior computation). The request can
be either allowed or denied, even if x-exception-id does not
indicate an exception.
3.4 Ethical Considerations
Even though the dataset studied in this paper is publicly available,
we are obviously aware of its sensitivity. Thus, we enforced a
few mechanisms to safeguard privacy of Syrian Internet users. We
encrypted all data (and backups) at rest and did not re-distribute the
logs. We never obtained or extracted users’ personal information,
and we only analyzed aggregated traffic statistics. While it is out of
the scope of this paper to further discuss the ethics of using “leaked
data” for research purposes (see [11] for a detailed discussion), we
argue that analyzing logs of filtered traffic, as opposed to probing-
based measurements, provides an accurate view for a large-scale
and comprehensive analysis of censorship.1
We acknowledge that our work may be beneficial to entities
on either side of censorship. However, our analysis helps under-
1Note that we obtained the approval of INRIA’s and NICTA’s Insti-
tutional Review Board (IRB) to publish results of this work.
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stand the technical aspects of an actual censorship ecosystem. Our
methodology exposes its underlying technologies, policies, as well
as its strengths and weaknesses, and can thus facilitate the design of
censorship-evading tools.
4. A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF
CENSORSHIP IN SYRIA
Aiming to provide an overview of Internet censorship in Syria,
our first step is to compare the statistical distributions of the different
classes of traffic (as defined in Section 3.3), and also look at domains,
TCP/UDP ports, website categories, and HTTPS traffic. Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, the results presented in this section are
based on the full dataset denoted as Dfull (see Section 3.3).
Traffic distribution. We start by observing the ratio of the different
classes of traffic. For each of the datasets Dfull, Dsample, Duser
and Ddenied, Table 3 reports how many requests are allowed, prox-
ied, denied, or censored. In Dfull, more than 93% of the requests
are allowed, and less than 1% of them are censored due to policy-
based decisions. The number of censored requests seems relatively
low compared to the number of allowed requests. Note, however,
that these numbers are skewed because of the request-based logging
mechanism, which “inflates” the volume of allowed traffic; a single
access to a website may trigger a large number of requests (e.g., for
the HTML content, accompanying images, scripts, tracking websites
and so on) that will be logged, whereas a denied request (either be-
cause it has been censored or due to a network error) only generates
one log entry. Finally, note that only a small fraction of requests are
proxied (0.47% in Dfull). The breakdown of x-exception-id values
within the proxied requests resembles that of the overall traffic.
Denied traffic. Proxies also log requests that have been denied due
to network errors: this happens for less than 6% of the requests
in our sample. The inability of the proxy to handle the request
(identified by the x-exception-id field being set to internal_error)
accounts for 31.15% of the overall denied traffic. Although this
could be considered censorship (no data is received by the user),
these requests do not actually trigger any policy exception and are
not the result of policy-based censorship. TCP errors, typically
occurring during the connection establishment between the proxy
and the target destination, represent more than 45% of the denied
traffic. Other errors include DNS resolving issues (0.41%), invalid
HTTP request or response formatting (5.65%), and unsupported
protocols (1.46%). The remaining 15.33% of denied traffic represent
the actual censored requests, which the proxy flags as denied due to
policy enforcement.
Ports. We also look at the traffic distribution by port number for both
allowed and censored traffic (in Dfull). We report it in Fig. 1. Ports
80 and 443 (HTTPS) represent the majority of censored content.
Port 9001 (usually associated with Tor servers) is ranked third in
terms of blocked connections. We discuss Tor traffic in more detail
in Section 7.1.
Domains. Next, we analyze the distribution of the number of re-
quests per unique domain. Fig. 2 presents our findings. The y-axis
(log-scale) represents the number of (allowed/denied/censored) re-
quests, while each point in the x-axis (also log-scale) represents the
number of domains receiving such a number of requests. Unsurpris-
ingly, the curves indicate a power law distribution. We observe that
a very small fraction of hosts (10−5 for the allowed requests) are
the target of between few thousands to few millions requests, while
the vast majority are the destination of only few requests. Allowed
traffic is at some point one order of magnitude bigger than denied
traffic, this happens for at least two reasons: (i) allowed requests
Figure 1: Destination port distributions of allowed and censored
traffic (Dfull).
target highly popular websites (e.g., Google and Facebook), and (ii)
an allowed request is potentially followed up by additional requests
to the same domain, whereas a denied request is not.
In Table 4, we report the top-10 allowed (resp., censored) domains
in Dfull. Unsurprisingly, google.com and its associated static/track-
ing/advertisement components represent nearly 15% of the total
allowed requests. Other well-ranked domains include facebook.com
(and its associated CDN service, fbcdn.net) and xvideos.com (a
pornography-associated website). The top-10 censored domains
exhibit a very different distribution: facebook.com (and fbcdn.net),
metacafe.com (a popular user-contributed video sharing service)
and skype.com account for more than 43% of the overall censored
requests. Finally, observe that websites like Facebook and Google
are present both in the censored and the allowed traffic, since the
policy-based filtering may depend on the actual content the user is
fetching rather than the website, as we will explain in Section 6.
Categories. The Blue Coat proxies support filtering according to
URL categories. This categorization can be done using a local
database, or using Blue Coat’s online filtering tool.2 However,
according to Blue Coat’s representatives [24], the online services
are not accessible to the Syrian proxy servers, and apparently the
Syrian proxy servers are not using a local copy of this categorization
database. Indeed, the cs-categories field in the logs, which records
2http://sitereview.bluecoat.com/categories.jsp
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4
sc-filter-result x-exception-id Class Full (Dfull) Sample (Dsample) User (Duser) Denied (Ddenied)
OBSERVED – Allowed 700,606,503 (93.25%) 30,140,158 (93.28%) 6,038,461 (94.73%) – –
PROXIED (total) Proxied 3,504,485 (0.47%) 151,554 (0.47%) 26,541 (0.42%) 267,354 (0.56%)
DENIED (total) Denied 47,184,840 (6.28%) 2,019,246 (6.25%) 309,331 (4.85%) 47,184,840 (99.44%)
tcp_error
Error
21,499,871 (2.86%) 947,083 (2.93%) 54,073 (0.85%) 21,499,871 (45.30%)
internal_error 14,720,952 (1.96%) 636,335 (1.97%) 198,058 (3.11%) 14,720,952 (31.02%)
invalid_request 2,668,217 (0.36%) 115,297 (0.36%) 36,292 (0.57%) 2,668,217 (5.62%)
unsupported_protocol 719,189 (0.10%) 28,769 (0.09%) 1,348 (0.02%) 719,189 (1.51%)
dns_unresolved_hostname 141,558 (0.02%) 6,247 (0.02%) 3,856 (0.06%) 141,558 (0.30%)
dns_server_failure 58,401 (0.01%) 2,235 (0.01%) 396 (0.01%) 58,401 (0.12%)
unsupported_encoding 269 (0.00%) 6 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 269 (0.00%)
invalid_response 8 (0.00%) 1 (0.00%) 2 (0.00%) 8 (0.00%)
policy_denied Censored 7,374,500 (0.98%) 283,197 (0.88%) 15,306 (0.24%) 7,374,500 (15.54%)policy_redirect 1,875 (0.00%) 76 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1,875 (0.04%)
Table 3: Statistics of different decisions and exceptions in the three datasets in use.
Allowed domains Censored domains
Domain # Requests (%) Domain # Requests (%)
google.com 50.36M (7.19%) facebook.com 1.62M (21.91%)
xvideos.com 23.42M (3.34%) metacafe.com 1.28M (17.33%)
gstatic.com 23.10M (3.30%) skype.com 503,932 (6.83%)
facebook.com 17.83M (2.54%) live.com 441,408 (5.98%)
microsoft.com 16.64M (2.38%) google.com 420,862 (5.71%)
fbcdn.net 16.46M (2.35%) zynga.com 379,170 (5.14%)
windowsupdate.com 15.43M (2.20%) yahoo.com 369,948 (5.02%)
google-analytics.com 12.38M (1.77%) wikimedia.org 306,994 (4.16%)
doubleclick.net 11.19M (1.60%) fbcdn.net 264,512 (3.59%)
msn.com 11.01M (1.57%) ceipmsn.com 135,134 (1.83%)
Table 4: Top-10 Domains (allowed and censored) in Dfull.
the URL categories, contains only one of two values: one value
associated with a default category (named “unavailable” in five of the
proxies, and “none” in the other two), and another value associated
with a custom category targeted at Facebook pages (named “Blocked
sites; unavailable” in five of the proxies, and “Blocked sites” in the
other two), which is discussed in more details in Section 6.
Due to the absence of URL categories, we use McAfee’s Trusted-
Source tool (www.trustedsource.org) to characterize the censored
websites. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the censored requests
across the different categories. The “Content Server” category ranks
first, with more than 25% of the blocked requests (this category
mostly includes CDNs that host a variety of websites, such as
cloudfront.net, googleusercontent.com). “Streaming Media” are
next, hinting at the intention of the censors to block video sharing.
“Instant Messaging” (IM) websites, as well as “Portals Sites”, are
also highly blocked, possibly due to their role in coordination of
social activities and protests. Note that both Skype and live.com
IM services are always censored and belong to the top-10 censored
domains. However, surprisingly, both “News Portals” and “Social
Networks” rank relatively low: as we explain in Section 6, censor-
ship only blocks a few well-targeted social media pages. Finally,
categories like “Games” and “Education/Reference” are also occa-
sionally blocked.
HTTPS traffic. The number of HTTPS requests is a few orders
of magnitude lower than that of HTTP requests. HTTPS accounts
for 0.08% of the overall traffic and only a small fraction (0.82%) is
censored (Dsample dataset). It is interesting to observe that, in 82%
of the censored traffic, the destination field indicates an IP address
rather than a domain, and such an IP-based blocking occurs at least
for two main reasons: (1) the IP address belongs to an Israeli AS, or
(2) the IP address is associated with an Anonymizer service. The
remaining part of the censored HTTPS traffic actually contains a
hostname: this is possible due to the use of the HTTP CONNECT
Figure 3: Category distribution of censored traffic (Dsample). Cat-
egories obtained from McAfee’s TrustedSource, ‘Other’ is used for
categories with less than 1K requests.
method, which allows the proxy to identify both the destination host
and the user agent (for instance, all connections to Skype servers
are using the CONNECT method, and thus the proxy can censor
requests based on the skype.com domain).
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Syrian Tele-
com Ministry has launched man in the middle (MITM) attacks
against the HTTPS version of Facebook.3 While Blue Coat proxies
indeed support interception of HTTPS traffic,4 we do not identify
any clear sign of such an activity. For instance, the values of fields
such as cs-uri-path, cs-uri-query and cs-uri-ext, which would have
been available to the proxies in a MITM attack, are not present
in HTTPS requests. However, also note that, by default, the Blue
Coat proxies use a separate log facility to record SSL traffic,5 so it
is possible that this traffic has been recorded in logs that were not
obtained by Telecomix.
User-based analysis. Based on theDuser dataset, which comprises
the logs of proxy SG-42 from July 22-23, we analyze user behavior
with respect to censorship. We assume that each unique combination
of c-ip (client IP address) and cs-user-agent designates a unique
user. This means that a user connecting from several devices with
different IP addresses (or a single device with different browsers)
is not considered as a single users. Conversely, users behind NAT
3https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/05/syrian-man-middle-
against-facebook
4https://kb.bluecoat.com/index?page=content&id=KB5500
5See https://bto.bluecoat.com/doc/8672, page 22.
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Figure 4: (a) Number of censored requests per user in Duser; (b)
The distribution of the overall number of requests per user (both
allowed and denied), for censored and non-censored users.
using browsers with identical user-agent are counted as one user.
However, this combination of fields provides the best approximation
of unique users within the limits of the available data [30].
We identify 147,802 total users in Duser . 2,319 (1.57%) of them
generate at least one request that is denied due to censorship.
Fig. 4(b) shows the distribution of the number of overall requests
per user, for both non-censored and censored users, where a cen-
sored user is defined as a user for whom at least one request was
censored. We found that the censored users are more active than non-
censored users, observing approximately 50% of the censored users
have sent more than 100 requests, while only 5% of non-censored
users show the same level of activity. As we discuss in Section 5.4,
many requests are censored since they happen to contain a black-
listed keyword (e.g., proxy), even though they may not be actually
accessing content that is the target of censorship. Since active users
are more likely to encounter URLs that contain such keywords, this
may explain the correlation between the user level of activity and
being censored. We also observe that in some cases the user agent
field refers to a software repeatedly trying to access a censored page
(e.g., skype.com), which augments the user’s activity.
Summary. Our measurements have shown that only a small fraction
(<1%) of the traffic is actually censored. Most requests are either
allowed (93.28%) or denied due to network errors (5.37%). Cen-
sorship targets mostly HTTP content, but several other services are
also blocked. Unsurprisingly, most of the censorship activity targets
websites that support user interaction (e.g., Instant Messaging and
social networks). A closer look at the top allowed and censored
domains shows that some hosts are in both categories, thus hinting
at a more sophisticated censoring mechanism, which we explore in
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Figure 5: Censored and allowed traffic over 5 days (absolute/nor-
malized).
the next sections. Finally, our user-based analysis has shown that
only a small fraction of users are directly affected by censorship.
5. UNDERSTANDING THE CENSORSHIP
This section aims to understand the way the Internet is filtered
in Syria. We analyze censorship’s temporal characteristics and
compare the behavior of different proxies. Then, we study how the
requests are filtered and infer characteristics on which censorship
policies are based.
5.1 Temporal Analysis
We start by looking at how the traffic volume of both censored
and allowed traffic changes over time (5 days), with 5-minute gran-
ularity. The corresponding time-series are reported in Fig. 5(a): as
expected, they roughly follow the same patterns, with an increasing
volume of traffic early mornings, followed by a smooth lull during
afternoons and nights. To evaluate the overall variation of the cen-
sorship activity, we show in Fig. 5(b) the temporal evolution of the
number of censored (resp., allowed) requests at specific times of the
day, normalized by the total number of censored (resp., allowed)
requests. Note that the two curves are not comparable, but illustrate
the relative activity when considering the overall nature of the traffic
over the observation period. The relative censorship activity exhibits
a few peaks, with a higher volume of censored content on particular
periods of time. There are also two sudden “drops” in both allowed
and censored requests, which might be correlated to some protests
that day.6 There is a visible reduction in traffic from Thursday after-
noon (August 4) to Friday (August 5), consistent with press reports
of Internet connections being slowed almost every Friday “when the
big weekly protests are staged” [20].
To further study the activity peaks, we zoom in on one specific day
(August 3) that has a particularly high volume of censored traffic.
Let RCV (Relative Censored traffic Volume) be the ratio between
the number of censored requests at a time frame (with a 5-minute
granularity) and the total number of requests received on the same
6See http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2011/8/3/syria-and-
beyond-liveblog-the-sights-and-sounds-of-protest.html.
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Figure 6: Relative Censored traffic Volume (RCV) for August 3 (in
Dsample) as a function of time.
6am - 8am 8am - 10am 10am -12pm
Domain % Domain % Domain %
metacafe.com 20.4% skype.com 29.24% facebook.com 22.47%
trafficholder.com 16.87% facebook.com 19.45% metacafe.com 18.56%
facebook.com 15.08% live.com 9.59% live.com 11.93%
google.com 8.15% metacafe.com 7.59% skype.com 11.79%
yahoo.com 6.43% google.com 6.76% google.com 6.81%
zynga.com 5.14% yahoo.com 3.57% zynga.com 3.43%
live.com 3.04% wikimedia.org 2.47% ceipmsn.com 2.38%
conduitapps.com 1.45% trafficholder.com 2.06% mtn.com.sy 2.13%
all4syria.info 1.44% dailymotion.com 1.58% panet.co.il 1.02%
hotsptshld.com 1.18% conduitapps.com 1.11% bbc.co.uk 0.91%
Table 5: Top censored domains, August 3, 6am-12pm.
time frame; in Fig. 6, we plot RCV as a function of the time of day.
There are a few sharp increases in censored traffic, with the fraction
of censored content increasing from 1% to 2% of the total traffic
around 8am, while, around 9.30am, the RCV variation exhibits a
sudden decay. A few other peaks are also observed early morning
(5am) and evening (10pm).
We then analyze the distribution of censored content between
8am and 9.30am on August 3 and, in Table 5, we report the top-10
censored domains during this period and the adjacent ones (as well
as the corresponding percentage of censored volume each domain
represents). It is evident that skype is being heavily blocked (up
to 29% of the censored traffic), probably due to the protests that
happened in Syria on August 3, 2011. However, 9% of the requests
to Skype servers are related to update attempts (for Windows clients)
and all of them are denied. There is also an unusually higher number
of requests to MSN live messenger service (through msn.com),
thus suggesting that the censorship activity peaks might perhaps
be correlated to high demand targeting Instant Messaging software
websites.7 In conclusion, censorship peaks might be due to sudden
higher volumes of traffic targeting Skype and MSN live messenger
websites, which are being systematically censored by the proxies.
5.2 Comparing different proxies
We now compare the behavior of the 7 different proxies whose
logs are included in our datasets. In Fig. 7(a), we plot the traffic
distribution across proxies, restricted to two days (August 3 and 4) to
ease presentation. Note that the load is fairly distributed among the
proxies, however, if one only considers censored traffic (Fig. 7(b)),
different behaviors become evident. In particular, Proxy SG-48 is
responsible for a large proportion of the censored traffic, especially
at certain times. One possible explanation is that different proxies
follow different policies, or there could be a high proportion of
censored (or likely to be censored) traffic being redirected to proxy
SG-48 during one specific period of time.
7Very similar results also occur for other periods of censorship
activity peaks.
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Figure 7: The distribution of traffic load through each proxy and
censored traffic over time.
We also consider the top-10 censored domain names in the period
of time August 3 (12am)–August 4 (12am) and observe that the
domain metacafe.com is always censored and that almost all re-
lated requests (more than 95%) are processed only by proxy SG-48.
This might be due to a domain-based traffic redirection process: in
fact, we observed a very similar behavior for skype.com during the
censorship peaks analysis presented earlier in Section 5.1.
In order to verify our hypotheses, we evaluate the similarity be-
tween censored requests handled by each proxy. We do so by relying
on the Cosine Similarity, defined as
cosine_similarity(A,B) =
∑n
i=1 Ai ×Bi√∑n
i=1(Ai)
2 ×√∑ni=1(Bi)2
where Ai and Bi denote the number of requests for domain i cen-
sored by proxies A and B, respectively. Note that cosine_similarity
lies in the range [-1,1], with -1 indicating patterns that are not at all
similar, and 1 indicating a perfect match. We report the values of
cosine_simlarity between the different proxies in Table 6. A few
proxies exhibit high similarity, while others very low. This suggests
that a few proxies are “specialized” in censoring specific types of
content.
SG-42 SG-43 SG-44 SG-45 SG-46 SG-47 SG-48
SG-42 1.0 0.5944 0.5424 0.3905 0.6134 0.2921 0.0896
SG-43 0.5944 1.0 0.8226 0.4769 0.821 0.3138 0.0696
SG-44 0.5424 0.8226 1.0 0.6177 0.8757 0.3003 0.0721
SG-45 0.3905 0.4769 0.6177 1.0 0.4752 0.2316 0.6701
SG-46 0.6134 0.821 0.8757 0.4752 1.0 0.3294 0.066
SG-47 0.2921 0.3138 0.3003 0.2316 0.3294 1.0 0.0455
SG-48 0.0896 0.0696 0.0721 0.6701 0.066 0.0455 1.0
Table 6: Cross correlation of censored domains: Cosine similarity
between different proxy servers (day: 2011-08-03).
We also look at the categories distribution of all requests across
the different proxies and concentrate on two categories, “Unavail-
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cs_host # requests %
upload.youtube.com 12,978 86.79%
www.facebook.com 1,599 10.69%
ar-ar.facebook.com 264 1.77%
competition.mbc.net 50 0.33%
sharek.aljazeera.net 44 0.29%
Table 7: Top-5 hosts for policy_redirect requests in Dfull.
able” and “None”, which show a peculiar distribution across the
proxies (recall that categories have been discussed in Section 4).
We note that the “None” category is only observed on two different
proxies (SG-43 and SG-48), while “Unavailable” is less frequently
observed on these two. This suggests either different configuration
of the proxies or a content specialization of the proxies.
5.3 Denied vs. Redirected Traffic
Requests are censored in one of two ways: they are either denied
or redirected. If a request triggers a policy_denied exception, the
requested page is not served to the client. Upon triggering pol-
icy_redirect, the request is redirected to another URL. For these
requests, we only have information from the x-exception-id field (set
to policy_redirect) and the s-action field (set to tcp_policy_redirect).
The policy_redirect exception is raised for a small number of hosts
– 11 in total. As reported in Table 7, the most common URLs are
upload.youtube.com and Facebook-owned domains.
Note that the redirection should trigger an additional request from
the client to the redirected URL immediately after policy_redirect is
raised. However, we found no trace of a secondary request coming
right after (within a 2-second window). Thus, we conclude that
the secondary URL is either hosted on a website that does not
require to go through the filtering proxies (most likely, this site is
hosted in Syria) or that the request is processed by proxies other
than those in the dataset. Since the destination of the redirection
remains unknown, we do not know whether or not redirections point
to different pages, depending on the censored request.
5.4 Category, String, and IP-based Filtering
We now study the three main triggers of censorship decisions:
URL categories, strings, and IP addresses.
Category-based Filtering. According to Blue Coat’s documenta-
tion [1], proxies can associate a category to each request (in the
cs-categories field), based on the corresponding URL, and this cate-
gory can be used in the filtering rules. In the set of censored requests,
we identify only two categories: a default category (named “unavail-
able" or "none", depending on the proxy server), and a custom
category (named “Blocked sites; unavailable" or “Blocked sites").
The custom category targets specific Facebook pages with a pol-
icy_redirect policy, accounts for 1,924 requests, and is discussed in
detail in Section 6. All the other URLs (allowed or denied) are cate-
gorized to the default category, which is subject to a more general
censorship policy, and captures the vast majority of the censored re-
quests. The censored requests in the default category consist mostly
of policy_denied with a small portion (0.21% either PROXIED or
DENIED) of policy_redirect exceptions. We next investigate the
policy applied within the default category.
String-based Filtering. The filtering process is also based on par-
ticular strings included in the requested URL. In fact, the string-
based filtering only relies on URL-related fields, specifically cs-host,
cs-uri-path and cs-uri-query, which fully characterize the request.
The proxies’ filtering process is performed using a simple string-
matching engine that detects any blacklisted substring in the URL.
Domain Censored Allowed Proxied
metacafe.com 1,278,583 (17.33%) 0 (0.00%) 1,164 (0.03%)
skype.com 503,932 (6.83%) 0 (0.00%) 1,313 (0.04%)
wikimedia.org 306,994 (4.16%) 0 (0.00%) 3,379 (0.10%)
.il 112,369 (1.52%) 0 (0.00%) 8,785 (0.25%)
amazon.com 62,759 (0.85%) 0 (0.00%) 345 (0.01%)
aawsat.com 51,518 (0.70%) 0 (0.00%) 5,670 (0.16%)
jumblo.com 23,214 (0.31%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
jeddahbikers.com 21,274 (0.29%) 0 (0.00%) 130 (0.00%)
badoo.com 14,502 (0.20%) 0 (0.00%) 358 (0.01%)
islamway.com 14,408 (0.20%) 0 (0.00%) 329 (0.01%)
Table 8: Top-10 domains suspected to be censored (number of
requests and percentage for each class of traffic in Dfull).
Category (#domains) Censored requests
Instant Messaging (2) 47,116 (16.63%)
Streaming Media (6) 39,282 (13.87%)
Education/Reference (4) 27,106 (9.57%)
General News (62) 8,700 (3.07%)
NA (42) 6,776 (2.39%)
Online Shopping (2) 4,712 (1.66%)
Internet Services (6) 2,964 (1.05%)
Social Networking (6) 2,114 (0.75%)
Entertainment (4) 1,828 (0.65%)
Forum/Bulletin Boards (8) 1,606 (0.57%)
Table 9: Top-10 domain categories censored by URL (number of
censored requests and percentage of censored traffic in Dsample).
We now aim to recover the list of strings that have been used to
filter requests in our dataset. We expect that a string used for censor-
ship should only be found in the set of censored requests and never
in the set of allowed ones (for this purpose, we consider PROXIED
requests separately from OBSERVED requests, since they do not
necessarily indicate an allowed request, even when no exception
is logged). In order to identify these strings, we use the following
iterative approach: (1) Let C be the set of censored URLs and A the
set of allowed URLs; (2) Manually identify a string w appearing
frequently in C; (3) Let NC and NA be the number of occurrences
of w in C andA, respectively; (4) If NC >> 1 and NA = 0 then re-
move from C all requests containing w, add w to the list of censored
strings, and go to step 2.
To mitigate selection of strings that are unrelated to the censor-
ship decision during the manual string identification (step 2), we
took a conservative approach by only considering non-ambiguous
requests. For instance, we select simple requests, e.g., HTTP GET
new-syria.com/, which only contains a domain name and has
an empty path and an empty query field. Thus, we are sure that the
string new-syria.com is the source of the censorship.
URL-based Filtering. Using the iterative process described above,
we identify a list of 105 “suspected” domains, for which no request
is allowed. Table 8 presents the top-10 domains in the list, according
to the number of censored requests. We further categorized each
domain in the list and show in Table 9 the top-10 categories accord-
ing to the number of censored requests. Clearly, there is a heavy
censorship of Instant Messaging software, as well as news, public
forums, and user-contributed streaming media sites.
Keyword-based Filtering. We also identify five keywords that
trigger censorship when found in the URL (cs-host, cs-path and cs-
query fields): proxy, hotspotshield, ultrareach, israel, and ultrasurf.
We report the corresponding number of censored, allowed, and prox-
ied requests in Table 10. Four of them are related to anti-censorship
technologies and one refers to Israel. Note that a large number of
requests containing the keyword proxy are actually related to seem-
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Keyword Censored Allowed Proxied
proxy 3,954,795 (53.61%) 0 (0.00%) 14,846 (0.42%)
hotspotshield 126,127 (1.71%) 0 (0.00%) 816 (0.02%)
ultrareach 50,769 (0.69%) 0 (0.00%) 68 (0.00%)
israel 48,119 (0.65%) 0 (0.00%) 477 (0.01%)
ultrasurf 31,483 (0.43%) 0 (0.00%) 541 (0.02%)
Table 10: The list of 5 keywords identified as censored (fraction
and number of requests for each class of traffic in Dfull).
Country Censorship # Censored # Allowed
Ratio (%)
Israel 6.69 5,191 72,416
Kuwait 2.02 16 776
Russian Federation 0.64 959 149,161
United Kingdom 0.26 2,490 942,387
Netherlands 0.17 12,206 7,077,371
Singapore 0.13 19 14,768
Bulgaria 0.09 14 14,786
Table 11: Censorship ratio for top censored countries in DIPv4.
Censored Allowed Proxied
Subnet # req. # IPs # req. # IPs # req. # IPs
84.229.0.0/16 574 198 0 0 4 4
46.120.0.0/15 571 11 5 1 0 0
89.138.0.0/15 487 148 1 1 3 3
212.235.64.0/19 474 5 325 1 0 0
212.150.0.0/16 471 3 6,366 12 1 1
Table 12: Top censored Israeli subnets.
ingly “non sensitive” content, e.g., online ads content, tracking com-
ponents or online APIs, but are nonetheless blocked. For instance,
the Google toolbar API invokes a call to /tbproxy/af/query,
which can be found on the google.com domain, and is unrelated to
anti-censorship software. Nevertheless, this element accounts for
4.85% of the censored requests in the Dsample dataset. Likewise,
the keyword proxy is also included in some online social networks’
advertising components (see Section 6).
IP-based censorship. We now focus on understanding whether
some requests are censored based on IP address. To this end, we
look at the requests for which the cs-host field is an IPv4 address and
notice that some of the URLs of censored requests do not contain
any meaningful information except for the IP address. As previously
noted, censorship can be done at a country level, e.g., for Israel,
as all .il domains are blocked. Thus, we consider the possibility
of filtering traffic with destination in some specific geographical
regions, based on the IP address of the destination host.
We construct DIPv4, which includes the set of requests (from
Dfull) for which the cs-host field is an IPv4 address. We geo-
localize each IP address in DIPv4 using the Maxmind GeoIP
database.8 We then introduce, for each identified country, the cor-
responding censorship ratio, i.e., the number of censored requests
over the total number of requests to this country. Table 11 presents
the censorship ratio for each country in DIPv4. Israel is by far the
country with the highest censorship ratio, suggesting that it might
be subject to an IP-based censorship.
Next, we focus on Israel and zoom in to the subnet level.9 Table 12
presents, for each of the top censored Israeli subnets, the number of
requests and IP addresses that are censored and allowed. We identify
8http://www.maxmind.com/en/country
9The list of IPv4 subnets corresponding to Israel is available from
http://www.ip2location.com/free/visitor-blocker.
OSN Censored Allowed Proxied
facebook.com 1,616,174 (21.91%) 17.70M (2.53%) 125,988 (3.60%)
badoo.com 14,502 (0.20%) 0 (0.00%) 358 (0.01%)
netlog.com 9,252 (0.13%) 0 (0.00%) 2,227 (0.06%)
linkedin.com 7,194 (0.10%) 186,047 (0.03%) 1,723 (0.05%)
skyrock.com 3,307 (0.04%) 7,564 (0.00%) 11 (0.00%)
hi5.com 2,995 (0.04%) 210,411 (0.03%) 463 (0.01%)
twitter.com 163 (0.00%) 2.83M (0.40%) 14,654 (0.42%)
ning.com 6 (0.00%) 41,993 (0.01%) 69 (0.00%)
meetup.com 3 (0.00%) 108 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
flickr.com 2 (0.00%) 383,212 (0.05%) 3179 (0.09%)
Table 13: Top-10 censored social networks in Dfull (number and
percentage of requests for each class of traffic).
two distinct groups: subnets that are almost always censored (except
for a few exceptions of allowed requests), e.g., 84.229.0.0/16, and
those that are either censored or allowed but for which the number of
allowed requests is significantly larger than that of the censored ones,
e.g. 212.150.0.0/16. One possible reason for a systematic subnet
censorship could be related to blacklisted keywords. However, this
is not the case in our analysis since the requested URL is often
limited to a single IP address (cs-uri-path and cs-uri-query fields are
empty). We further check, using McAfee smart filter, that none but
one (out of 1155 IP addresses) of the censored Israeli IP addresses
are categorized as Anonymizer hosts. These results show then that
IP filtering targets a few geographical areas, i.e., Israeli subnets.
5.5 Summary
The analysis presented in this section has shown evidence of
domain-based traffic redirection between proxies. A few proxies
seem to be specialized in censoring specific domains and type of con-
tent. Also, our findings suggest that the censorship activity reaches
peaks mainly because of unusually high demand for Instant Messag-
ing Software websites (e.g., Skype), which are blocked in Syria. We
found that censorship is based on four main criteria: URL-based fil-
tering, keyword-based filtering, destination IP address, and a custom
category-based censorship (further discussed in the next section).
The list of blocked keywords and domains demonstrates the intent
of Syrian censors to block political and news content, video sharing,
and proxy-based censorship-circumvention technologies. Finally,
Israeli-related content is heavily censored as the keyword Israel, the
.il domain, and some Israeli subnets are blocked.
6. CENSORSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA
In this section, we analyze the filtering and censorship of Online
Social Networks (OSNs) in Syria. Social media have often been
targeted by censors, e.g., during the recent uprisings in the Middle
East and North Africa. In Syria, according to our logs, popular
OSNs like Facebook and Twitter are not entirely censored and most
traffic is allowed. However, we observe that a few specific keywords
(e.g., proxy) and a few pages (e.g., the ‘Syrian Revolution’ Facebook
page) are blocked, thus suggesting a targeted censorship.
We select a representative set of social networks containing the
top 25 social networks according to alexa.com as of November 2013,
and add 3 social networks popular in Arabic-speaking countries:
netlog.com, salamworld.com, and muslimup.com. For each of these,
we extract the number of allowed, censored and proxied requests in
Dfull, and report the top-10 censored social networks in Table 13.
We find no evidence of systematic censorship for most sites (in-
cluding last.fm, MySpace, Google+, Instagram, and Tumblr), as all
requests are allowed. However, for a few social networks (including
Facebook, Linkedin, Twitter, and Flickr) many requests are blocked.
Several requests are censored based on blacklisted keywords (e.g.,
proxy, Israel), thus suggesting that the destination domain is not the
9
Facebook page # Censored # Allowed # Proxied
Syrian.Revolution 1461 891 16
Syrian.revolution 0 0 25
syria.news.F.N.N 191 165 1
ShaamNews 114 3944 7
fffm14 42 18 0
barada.channel 25 9 0
DaysOfRage 19 2 0
Syrian.R.V 10 6 0
YouthFreeSyria 6 0 0
sooryoon 3 0 0
Freedom.Of.Syria 3 0 0
SyrianDayOfRage 1 0 0
Table 14: Top blocked Facebook pages in Dfull.
actual reason of censorship. However, requests to Netlog and Badoo
are never allowed and there is only a minority of requests containing
blacklisted keywords, which suggests that these domains are always
censored. In fact, both netlog.com and badoo.com were identified
in the list of domains suspected for URL-based filtering, described
in Section 5.4.
Facebook. The majority of requests to Facebook are allowed, yet
facebook.com is one of the most censored domains. As we explain
below, censored requests can be classified into two groups: (i)
requests to Facebook pages with sensitive (political) content, and (ii)
requests to the social platform with the blacklisted keyword proxy.
Censored Facebook pages. Several Facebook pages are censored
for political reasons and are identified by the proxies using the
custom category “Blocked Sites.” Requests to those pages trigger
a policy_redirect exception, thus redirecting the user to a page
unknown to us. Interestingly, Reporters Without Borders [20] stated
that “the government’s cyber-army, which tracks dissidents on online
social networks, seems to have stepped up its activities since June
2011. Web pages that support the demonstrations were flooded
with pro-Assad messages.” While we cannot infer the destination of
redirection, we argue that this mechanism could technically serve as
a way to show specific content addressing users who access targeted
Facebook pages.
Table 14 lists the Facebook pages we identify in the logs that fall
into the custom category. All the requests identified as belonging
to the custom category are censored. However, we find that not
all requests to the facebook.com/<censored_page> pages are cor-
rectly categorized as “Blocked Site.” For instance, www.facebook.
com/Syrian.Revolution?ref=ts is, but www.facebook.com/Syrian.
Revolution?ref=ts is, but www.facebook.com/Syrian.Revolution?
ref=ts&__a=11&ajaxpipe=1&quickling[version]=414343%3B0 is
not, thus suggesting that the categorization rules targeted a very
narrow range of specific cs-uri-path and cs-uri-query combinations.
As shown in Table 14, many requests to targeted Facebook pages
are allowed and no allowed request is categorized as “Blocked
Site.” We also identify successful requests sent to Facebook pages
such as Syrian.Revolution.Army, Syrian.Revolution.Assad, Syr-
ian.Revolution.Caricature and ShaamNewsNetwork, which are not
categorized as “Blocked Site” and are allowed. Finally, proxied
requests are sometimes, but not always, categorized as “Blocked
Site” (e.g., all the requests for the Syrian.revolution page).
Social plugins. Facebook provides so-called social plugins (one
common example is the Like button), which is loaded by web pages
to enable interaction with the social platform. Some of the URLs
used by these social plugins include the keyword proxy in the cs-uri-
path field or in the cs-uri-query field, and this automatically raises
the policy_denied exception whenever the page is loaded.
Social plug-in Censored Allowed Proxied
/plugins/like.php 694,788 (43.04%) 0 (0.00%) 8,919 (7.08%)
/extern/login_status.php 629,495 (38.99%) 0 (0.00%) 3,502 (2.78%)
/plugins/likebox.php 77,244 (4.78%) 0 (0.00%) 3555 (2.82%)
/plugins/send.php 70,146 (4.35%) 0 (0.00%) 272 (0.22%)
/plugins/comments.php 54,265 (3.36%) 0 (0.00%) 331 (0.26%)
/fbml/fbjs_ajax_proxy.php 42,649 (2.64%) 0 (0.00%) 43 (0.03%)
/connect/canvas_proxy.php 40,516 (2.51%) 0 (0.00%) 37 (0.03%)
/ajax/proxy.php 1,544 (0.10%) 0 (0.00%) 6 (0.00%)
/platform/page_proxy.php 1,519 (0.09%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (0.00%)
/plugins/facepile.php 669 (0.04%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (0.00%)
Table 15: Top-10 Facebook social plugin elements in Dfull (frac-
tion of Facebook traffic and number of requests).
Table 15 reports, for each of the top-10 social plugin elements, the
fraction of the Facebook traffic and the number of requests for each
class of traffic. The top two censored social plugin elements (/plugin-
s/like.php and /extern/login_status.php) account for more than 80%
of the censored traffic on the facebook.com domain, while the 10
social plugin elements we consider account for 99.9% (1,612,835)
of the censored requests on the facebook.com domain. To conclude,
the large number of censored requests on the facebook.com domain
is in fact mainly caused by social plugins elements that are not
related with censorship circumvention tools or any political content.
Summary. We have studied the censorship of 28 major online
social networks and found that most of them are not censored,
unless requests contain blacklisted keywords (such as proxy) in the
URL. This is particularly evident looking at the large amount of
Facebook requests that are censored due to the presence of proxy
in the query. Using a custom category, the censors also target a
selected number of Facebook pages, without blocking all traffic to
the site, thus making censorship and surveillance harder to detect
(as independently reported in [18]).
7. ANTI-CENSORSHIP TECHNOLOGIES
We now investigate the usage (and effectiveness) of censorship-
circumvention technologies based on our dataset.
7.1 Tor
According to the logs, access to the Tor project website and
the majority of Tor traffic were allowed in July/August 2011. In
fact, access to the Tor network was first reported to be blocked on
December 16, 2012 [23].
Tor traffic can be classified into two main classes: (1) HTTP
signaling, e.g., establishing connections with Tor directories, which
we denote as Torhttp, and (2) establishing Tor circuits and data
transfer, denoted as Toronion. To identify Tor traffic, we extract
Tor relays’ IP addresses and port numbers from the Tor server de-
scriptors and network status files (available from https://metrics.
torproject.org/formats.html). We then match the extracted <node IP,
port, date> triplets to the requests in Dfull to identify Tor traffic.
We further isolate HTTP signaling messages by identifying all HTTP
requests to Tor directories, e.g., /tor/server/authority.z
or /tor/keys.10 This does not take into account the connections
via Tor bridges: there is no public list of them (bridges are used to
overcome filtering of connections to known Tor relays), however,
Tor relays were not filtered in Syria as of 2011, thus users did not
actually need to use bridges.
We identify 95K requests to 1,111 different Tor relays, 73%
of which belong to Torhttp. Only a small fraction (1.38%) of
10See https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=
HEAD;f=dir-spec-v2.txt for a full description.
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Figure 8: (a) Number of Tor related requests per hour from August
1-6 inDfull.; (b) Percentage of all censored traffic and Tor censored
traffic by Proxy SG-44.
the requests are censored and 16.2% of them generate TCP errors.
Figure 8(a) shows the number of requests for August 1-6. The traffic
has several peaks, in particular on August 3, when several protests
were taking place. We observe that 99.9% of censored Tor traffic is
blocked by a single proxy (SG-44), even though the overall traffic
is uniformly distributed across all the 7 proxies. The other 0.01%
of the traffic is censored by SG-48. This finding echoes our earlier
discussion on the specialization of some proxies.
We also analyze the temporal pattern of Tor censored traffic and
compare it to the overall censored requests of SG-44. As shown
in Figure 8(b), Tor censoring exhibits a higher variance. While
censoring Torhttp is technically simple, as it only requires matching
of regular expressions against the HTTP requests, identifying and
censoring Toronion is more challenging, as it involves encrypted
traffic. However, only Toronion traffic is censored according to the
logs, while Torhttp is always allowed.
Next, we verify whether the Tor censorship is consistent (i.e.,
whether the blocked Tor relay is re-allowed later). To do so, we
proceed as follows: First, we create a set of all censored Tor relay
addresses denoted Censored-IPs. Then, for each one hour time
window considered as a time bin k, we create the set of all Tor relays
IP addresses that were allowed, we denote Allowed-IPs (k).
For each time bin k, we calculate the relative overlap between the
censored Tor relay nodes and the Tor relays allowed at bin k as:
Rfilter(k) = 1− |Censored-IPs ∩ Allowed-IPs(k)||Censored-IPs|
where | · | denotes the set size. Figure 9 depicts the variation of
Rfilter as a function of time. Note that Rfilter(k) equals 0 if,
at a specific time bin k, all connections to Censored-IPs are
allowed (line curve) or none of the IPs in Allowed are in Censored
(circle curve). Rfilter(k) equals 1 if none of the connections to
Censored-IPs have been allowed at a specific time bin k.
Figure 9: Ratio of (re)censored IPs SG-44.
The high variance of Rfilter shows that the censorship is in-
consistent. In fact, the beginning of this plot is either dominated
by red circles (all traffic is allowed) or few small peaks showing
a very mild censorship. Then few successive peaks with a high
variance of blockage appear for several hours, followed by a lull at
the night of 03 of August. The same scenario is repeated several
times, alternating between aggressive censorship and more mild
period. This behavior is hard to explain as some IPs are alternating
between blocked and allowed status. One explanation might be a
testing phase that is carried in a single router and for a short period
of time to test a new censorship approach (in this scenario the newly
deployed Tor censorship). Or, this censorship is based on fields that
are not logged by the appliance and hence inaccessible to us.
7.2 Web Proxies and VPNs
As already mentioned, access to web/socks proxies is censored,
as demonstrated by an aggressive filtering of requests including the
keyword proxy. In the following, we use “proxies” to refer to the
Blue Coat appliances whose logs we study in this paper, and “web
proxies” to refer to services used to circumvent censorship.
To use web proxies, end-users need to configure their browsers
or their network interfaces, or rely on tools (e.g., Ultrasurf) that
automatically redirect all HTTP traffic to the web proxy. Some
web proxies support encryption, and create a SSL-based encrypted
HTTP tunnel between the user and the web proxy. Similarly, VPN
tools (e.g., Hotspot Shield) are often used to circumvent censorship,
again, by relaying traffic through a VPN server.
We analyze the usage of VPN and web proxy tools and find
that a few of them are very popular among Internet users in Syria.
However, as discussed in Section 5.4, keywords like ultrasurf and
hotspotshield are heavily monitored and censored. Nonetheless,
some web proxies and VPN software (such as Freegate, GTunnel
and GPass) do not include the keyword proxy in request URLs
and are therefore not censored. Similarly, we do not observe any
censorship activity triggered by the keyword VPN.
Next, we focus on the domains that are categorized as “Anonymiz-
ers” by McAfee’s TrustedSource tool, including both web prox-
ies and VPN-related hosts. In the Dsample dataset, there are 821
“Anonymizer” domains, which are the target of 122K requests (repre-
senting 0.4% of the total number of requests). 92.7% of these hosts
(accounting for 25% of the requests) are never filtered. Figure 10(a)
shows the CDF of the number of requests sent to each of those
allowed hosts. Less than 10% of these hosts receive more than 100
requests, suggesting that only a few popular services attract a high
number of the requests.
Finally, we look at the 7.3% of the identified “Anonymizer” hosts,
for which some of the requests are censored. We calculate the ratio
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Figure 10: (a) CDF of the number of requests for identified
“anonymizer” hosts; (b) Ratio of Allowed versus Censored num-
ber of requests for identified “anonymizer” hosts.
between the number of allowed requests inDfull and the number of
censored requests in Ddenied. Figure 10(b) shows the CDF of this
censorship ratio. We observe a non-consistent policy for whether a
request is allowed or censored, with more than 50% of the proxies
showing a higher number of allowed requests than censored requests.
This suggests that these requests are not censored based on their
IP or hostname, but rather on other criteria, e.g., the inclusion of a
blacklisted keyword in the request.
In conclusion, while some services (such as Hotspot Shield) are
heavily censored, other, less known, services are not, unless related
requests contain blacklisted keywords. This somehow introduces a
trade-off between the ability to bypass censorship and promoting
censorship- and surveillance-evading tools (e.g., in web searches)
by including keywords such as proxy in the URL.
7.3 Peer-to-Peer networks
The distributed architecture of peer-to-peer networks makes them,
by nature, more resilient to censorship: users obtain content from
peers and not from a server, which makes it harder to locate and
block content. Shared data is usually identified by a unique identifier
(e.g., info hash in BitTorrent), and these identifiers are useless to
censors unless mapped back to, e.g., the description of the corre-
sponding files. However, resolving these identifiers is not trivial:
content can be created by anyone at any time, and the real description
can be distributed in many different ways, publicly and privately.
To investigate the use of peer-to-peer networks as a way to access
censored content, we look for signs of BitTorrent traffic. We find
a total of 338,168 BitTorrent announce requests from 38,575 users
(BitTorrent uses a 20-byte peer_id field to identify peers, which we
use to count unique users) for 35,331 unique contents in the Dfull
dataset.11 Most of these requests (99.97%) are allowed. Censored
requests can be explained with the occurrence of blacklisted key-
words, e.g., proxy, in the request URL. For instance, all announce
requests sent to the tracker on tracker-proxy.furk.net are censored.
Using the hashes of torrent files provided in the announce mes-
sages, we crawl torrentz.eu and torrentproject.com to extract the
titles of these torrent files, achieving a success rate of 77.4%. The
five blacklisted keywords, reported in Table 10, are actually present
in the titles of some of the BitTorrent files, yet the associated an-
nounce requests are allowed. We do not find any content that can be
directly associated with sensitive topics like “Syrian revolution” or
“Arab spring” (these files may still be shared via BitTorrent without
publicly announcing the content), however, we identify content re-
lating to anti-censorship software, such as UltraSurf (2,703 requests
for all versions), HideMyAss (176 requests), Auto Hide IP (532
requests) and anonymous browsers (393 requests). Our findings
suggest that peer-to-peer networks are indeed used by users inside
Syria to circumvent censorship to a certain extent. Also note that
BitTorrent is used to download Instant Messaging software, such
as Skype, MSN messenger, and Yahoo! Messenger, which cannot
be downloaded directly from the official download pages due to
censorship.
7.4 Google Cache
When searching for terms in Google’s search engine, the result
pages allow access to cached versions of suggested pages. While
Google Cache is not intended as an anti-censorship tool, a simple
analysis of the logs shows that it provides a way to access content
that is otherwise censored.
We identify a total of 4,860 requests accessing Google’s cache
on webcache.googleusercontent.com in the Dfull dataset. Only
12 of them are censored due to an occurrence of a blacklisted key-
word in the URL, and a single request to retrieve a cached version
of http://ar-ar.facebook.com/SYRIANREVOLUTION.K.N.N has
policy_denied, although it is not categorized as a “Blocked Site.”
However, the rest of the requests are allowed. Interestingly, some
of the allowed requests, although small in number, relate to cached
versions of webpages that are otherwise censored, such as www.
panet.co.il, aawsat.com, www.facebook.com/Syrian.Revolution, and
www.free-syria.com. While the use of Google cache to access cen-
sored content is obviously limited in scope, the logs actually suggest
that it is very effective. Thus, when properly secured with HTTPS,
Google cache could actually serve as a way to access censored
content.
7.5 Summary
The logs highlighted that Syrian users do resort to censorship
circumvention tools, with a relatively high effectiveness. While
some tools and websites are monitored and blocked (e.g., Hotspot
Shield), many others are successful in bypassing censorship. Our
study also shows that some tools that were not necessarily designed
as circumvention tools, such as BitTorrent and Google cache, could
provide additional ways to access censored content if proper precau-
tions are taken, especially considering that Syrian ISPs started to
block Tor relays and bridges in December 2012.
8. DISCUSSION
11BitTorrent clients send announce requests to BitTorrent servers
(aka trackers) to retrieve a list of IP addresses from which the
requested content can be downloaded.
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Economics of Censorship. Our analysis shows that Syrian authori-
ties deploy several techniques to filter Internet traffic, ranging from
blocking entire subnets to filtering based on specific keywords. This
range of techniques can be explained by the cost/benefit tradeoff
of censorship, as described, e.g., by Danezis and Anderson [10].
While censoring the vast majority of the Israeli network – regardless
of the actual content – can be explained on geo-political grounds,
completely denying the access to social networks, such as Facebook,
could generate unrest. For instance, facing the “Arab spring” up-
risings, the Syrian authorities decided to allow access to Facebook,
Twitter, and Youtube in February 2011. Nonetheless, these websites
are monitored and selectively censored. Censors might aim at a
more subtle control of the Internet, by only denying access to a
predefined set of websites, as well as a set of keywords. This shift is
achievable as the proxy appliances seamlessly support Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI), thus allowing fine-grained censorship in real-time.
Censorship’s target. Censored traffic encompasses a large va-
riety of content, mostly aiming to prevent users from using In-
stant Messaging software (e.g., Skype), video sharing websites
(e.g., metacafe.com, upload.youtube.com), Wikipedia, as well as
sites related to news and opposition parties (e.g., islammemo.cc,
alquds.co.uk). Censors also deliberately block any requests related
to a set of predefined anti-censorship tools (e.g., ‘proxy’). This
mechanism, however, has several side effects as it denies the access
to any page containing these keywords, including those that have
nothing to do with censorship circumvention.
Censorship Circumvention. We also highlighted that users at-
tempt to circumvent censorship. One interesting way is using Bit-
Torrent to download anti-censorship tools such as UltraSurf as well
as Instant Messaging software. Users also rely on known censorship-
evading technologies, such as web/socks proxies and Tor.
9. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a measurement analysis of Internet filtering
in Syria. We analyzed 600GB worth of logs produced by 7 Blue Coat
SG-9000 proxies in Summer 2011 and, by extracting information
about processed requests for both censored and allowed traffic,
we provided a detailed, first-of-a-kind snapshot of a real-world
censorship ecosystem. We uncovered the presence of a relatively
stealthy yet quite targeted filtering, which relies on IP addresses
to block access to entire subnets, on domains to block specific
websites, and on keywords to target specific content. Keyword-
based censorship (e.g., denying all requests containing the word
‘proxy’) also produces collateral damage, as many requests are
blocked even if they do not relate to sensitive content. Finally, we
showed that Instant Messaging software is heavily censored, that
filtering of social media appears to be limited to specific pages,
and that Syrian users try to circumvent censorship using web/socks
proxies, Tor, VPNs, and BitTorrent.
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